Inviting Failure: Citizen Participation and Local Governance in South Africa

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1. Introduction

Over the last few years there has been a wave of experimentation with public participation approaches to citizen engagement in Southern contexts. Led by the Brazilian successes with participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, many countries in the global south have introduced wide-ranging governance reforms aimed at engaging citizens in public decision-making and ensuring better representation of historically marginalized social groups.

This article examines the operation of new forms of public participation in local government in South Africa initiated ‘from above’ by the state. We try to assess whether formal public participation has made local governance more democratic and/or enhanced the delivery of social services. The answer suggested by our case-studies is ‘no’, or at least, ‘not yet’. Poor implementation, a lack of political will and the poor design of public participation institutions has undermined their operation to date. Further, there are good reasons to assume this parlous situation will continue into the future, with the consequence that government’s ‘invited spaces’ will not help the poor and marginalised improve their lives.

Democracy is relatively new in South Africa, with the first elections held as recently as 1994. Further, local government has undergone institutional reform from 1994 until 2000. A key part of this overhaul has been the requirement for democratic operation, including forms of public participation, in municipal decision-making between elections. Thus the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000 requires municipalities ‘to develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance’¹. These South African innovations are similar to, and to some extent inspired by, new local democratic institutions from around the world such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and Kerala.

The new system of ‘participatory governance’ has both structural and procedural moments. Structurally, the new system provides for committees to be established in each ward of a municipality. (Wards are spatial sub-divisions of a municipality, for example, Johannesburg is subdivided into 109 wards.) Ward committees are chaired by the ward councillor, and ten remaining members are elected from the local community. Ward committees may make representations on any issue affecting a ward to the ward councillor or through the councillor to the council. Procedurally, public involvement is required in various decision-making processes. Especially important here are the imperatives to public consultation around the annual municipal budget, the Integrated
Development Plan (IDP) and all by-laws, innovations which bring community participation to the core activities of local government.

Sadly however, our research suggests that the democratic and delivery dividends from participatory governance are few and far between. We show this through examination of case-studies of implementation in several municipalities. This failure is due to a complex combination of three factors: the poor implementation of public participation policy reflecting significant administrative weaknesses, a serious lack of political will amongst political elites to make public participation work, and lastly the poor design of these ‘invited spaces’, particularly as related to Fung and Archon’s criteria\(^2\). All this suggests that the formal or ‘invited spaces’ of public participation in South Africa will offer little meaningful for the foreseeable future.

Our paper points to a more complex set of interactions between getting the design principles right and stimulating participation from below, grounding efforts to institutionalize participation in contexts in which a number of further factors come to into play, from exclusive cultures of politics and protest, to how poor people come to participate in these spaces and the representational basis on which people enter these new spaces. Deepening poor people’s access to the resources of the local state requires not only face-to-face contact in institutionalised spaces where decisions are made, but also the expansion of the public sphere as an arena into which social movements can bring contentious politics and introduce alternative practices around the engaging citizens in public decision-making.

### 2. Why Public Participation?

Public participation, especially public participation in local governance, is a popular idea in current political thinking across the globe. The reasons for this are many. First, participation and decentralisation have become central elements of the dominant developmental model employed by the World Bank, United Nations and other agencies over the last twenty years. Where decentralisation is a response to the bottlenecks created by the disconnection between central governments and local communities, participation is a response to the disjuncture between outsider and local knowledge and ownership. Hence the World Bank contrasts its previous ‘external expert stance’, where development project sponsors and designers were outside the local system about which they took decisions, with the ‘participatory stance’. The latter involves not just consulting and listening to local people and being open to local innovation, but also local people directly participating in project decision-making\(^3\). In brief, experience has shown that meaningful public participation in development projects generates better outcomes, partly because of better informed and better quality deliberation, but also because of better support for projects through co-ownership. Hence one benefit of participation is better delivery due to better-conceived and implemented projects.

Other reasons for participation include its democratic dividends. This is articulated by new ‘deliberative’ or ‘discursive’ theories of democracy, unhappy with reducing
democracy to periodic elections\(^4\). Where some see public participation as enhancing democracy through uncovering new voices in informal or ‘wild’ spaces where communication is unconstrained and spontaneous\(^5\), others see deliberation as implying new structures to enhance deliberation, and so deepen democracy, in existing public institutions\(^6\). Key advocates of the latter are Fung and Wright and their analysis of the features of ‘Empowered Deliberative Democracy’ (EDD) institutions\(^7\). Notably, the support for deliberation or deliberative institutions is echoed by associative democratic theories of democratic consolidation which points to the central role of civil society as a counter-balance to state hegemony. Insofar as new democratic institutions enhance civil society’s influence over the state, they are seen as good for democracy. This is especially the case for those who see the electoral dominance of the ANC in South Africa as effectively constituting a ‘dominant party system’ with associated threats of unchallenged elite rule\(^8\).

Mainstream approaches to deliberative democracy are often criticized for assuming a static context, with the rules of the democratic game sufficiently crystallized for deliberative democratic practices to succeed. These mainstream approaches also may assume that systemic changes arise from the emergence of new actors and new participatory engagements between the actors, rather than from the internal logic of the system itself. In many Southern contexts, however, there is often little evidence of a democratic public sphere in which citizens can engage effectively with the state. Instead there is typically a marked disconnect between public spaces in which citizens voice their claims and the political sphere of the state and its institutions. This disconnect is embedded in a wider political culture that brings together democratic and clientilistic elements. In these contexts, political culture is shaped by often messy negotiations between old and new governance structures in post-authoritarian contexts. There may be little convergence between local democratic culture and state-driven culture. For instance, traditional authority and constitutional democracy in South Africa co-exist in complex ways.

In such contexts, people in poor communities often shift between clientship and citizenship claims. Democratic representation is often about patronage that will secure services for communities. Decentralization programs often serve to extend and further embed the logic of state paternalism and patronage. In patronage-driven political cultures, marginalized groups often have to ‘earn the right to respect’ from the state. In these contexts, democratic spaces are often not bestowed by the state or by a set of legal norms, but are struggled for and enacted in a set of diverse practices around contentious political issues. Because of their profoundly political and contested nature, these kinds of struggles rarely are fought within contained deliberative spaces.

So the political and institutional challenges of building spaces for deliberative democracy in these hybrid contexts have to be understood as well in the terms argued for by Leonardo Avritzer: ‘how to design institutions that can strengthen innovations around participation and deliberation which emerge at the public level while weakening the clientilistic political culture at the political level.’\(^9\) The ‘deliberative’ challenge lies in creating ‘participatory publics’ that widen the public sphere and link new democratic
spaces directly to the state. Participatory publics need to not only introduce new deliberative spaces, but also to address problematic elements in dominant culture and place these on the political agenda. There is always the risk of bringing marginalized groups into dialogue with the wrong partners. There is also the risk of monopolization of deliberative spaces by elites and patrons. In politically contentious contexts, there needs to be a careful choice of state interlocutors. So attention to new institutions in the contexts for deliberative democracy yields the question: What does deliberation mean in contexts where the public sphere does not exist in a meaningful way?

Another reason for participation is that it is seen as good for citizenship. Central here is the notion that the initiative for engagement is often led ‘from below’ by civil society or local communities rather ‘from above’ by the state. Hence Cornwall writes of contrasting the ‘invited spaces’ of the state with ‘organic spaces’ created by those outside the state. Out of these might emerge a ‘participatory sphere’ that lies at the interface of the public sphere and the state, composed of hybrid institutions, some of which are extensions of the state and some of which are claimed from the state. Such a sphere is good for citizenship in that it opens up new spaces for political agency in the pursuit of group or collective goods.

In addition to the theoretical reasons for public participation, there is an additional historical one from a South African perspective: the influence of the idea of ‘people’s power’ from anti-apartheid politics of the 1980s. Of particular importance here was the experience of participation in civic and other community-based organisations in historically-black areas. Indeed, according to Yunus Carrim, former chair of the parliamentary portfolio committee which drew up the key legislation around public participation, the framers of this legislation were almost all former civic and anti-apartheid activists, for whom the idea of participatory democracy would have been familiar. While clearly not the only political practice inherited by the reconstituted ANC after 1990, this participatory strain is still manifest in South African politics, and in particular, in the design of local governance. Notably, as Yunus Carrim points out, ‘the system overall seeks to provide a balance between giving residents the fullest space to participate in municipal affairs and ensuring the right of councillors to ultimately govern.’

Indeed, there is much to suggest that the recent emphasis on public participation in local government has much to do with the failure of local politicians in governing. Hence while institutions of participatory governance were established in 2000, the effort to institutionalise them came some five years later following a spate of country-wide protests (indeed we still await national policy on public participation). In the year preceding the 2006 local government elections, the Minister of Safety and Security reported some 5085 protests against inept and corrupt local government nationwide. Recognition by government that this dissatisfaction was justified was implied by ‘Project Consolidate’, an initiative of the national Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) to redress the fact that ‘modes of interaction, engagement and support to local government are not having the desired impact on local government and communities’. Notably 48% of South Africa’s 284 municipalities made this list. In
short, if the development of public participation policy in South Africa was motivated by lofty ideals, its recent implementation is mostly a response to local governance failure.

3. Citizenship and Participation in South Africa

Early post-apartheid public uses of the term ‘citizenship’ were embedded in the idea of ‘rights’, its core category. From 1994 on reference to the term ‘rights’ provided a common ground – and a connecting principle – for an immense diversity of political actors who found in the language of rights a way of expressing their claims, and helping them to find a place in the new democratic society. At the heart of emerging debates on democracy and citizenship was an emphasis on political rights, especially the right to vote. This quickly expanded into demands for social and economic rights, and more specifically cultural rights for minority groups like the San.

The term ‘citizenship’ was also implicit in emerging debates on ‘national unity’. In the months following the ANC victory in the 1994 elections as images of ‘non-racialism’ and ‘national unity’ and the phrase ‘the rainbow nation’ were routinely recycled in television advertisements, talk shows and soap operas. Vigorous debates emerged on the meanings of an overarching African identity. Tensions and differences over the meaning of ‘national unity’ and post-apartheid society’s new national identity reflected wide-spread preoccupations with diversity, political inclusion, as well as the need to deal with the dual legacies of racism and structural inequalities.

A crucial dimension defining the early political context for the emergence of the term ‘citizenship’ was the particular configuration of both the state and civil society and their mutual relationship in the immediate post-apartheid years. Early on tensions started to emerge between political leaders who saw little differentiation between state and society (in their view the new democratic state was acting like a democratic citizen by virtue of being led by a liberation movement which was now the dominant political party), and civil society leaders those who asserted the boundaries between state and civil society, and social movements’ autonomy from the state. The reasons for this are many, and include the fact that historically civil society activism was channelled into anti-apartheid activity in the 1980s, mostly under the hegemony of the ANC, which was effectively the dominant social movement in the country. After the 1994 elections the movements which mobilized people were absorbed into the ANC government or in partnership with government, and most held the view that government would deliver to the poor.17

Further, in state-driven discourses on democracy a conceptual separation between civil society and the state was made in public discussions, but was never acted on. The conceptual conflation between state and civil society, however, was not only the product of organisational history and distinct ideological choices on the part of the ANC-led state and its political discourses on the ‘national democratic struggle’; it also reflected the structural realities of post-apartheid’s institutional fabric, specifically the marked absence of local institutions and spaces mediating the relation between state and civil society. The new state had inherited a society with few institutional and structural possibilities for citizens to
‘oversee’ the state. In the initial post-apartheid phase state officials were primarily concerned with de-racialising institutions and installing new models of management. In the minds of many state officials there seemed to exist an implicit convergence of ‘state’ and ‘citizen’, given that for many ‘citizenship’ primarily entailed ensuring peoples’ rights to the provision of basic services by the state.

The largely implicit deployment of the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’ in the early post-apartheid years morphed into more explicit ones as new cycles of the democratic process started taking place. The early focus on diversity and inclusive citizenship through which the term ‘citizenship’ evolved, soon expanded into new debates on local government reforms and ‘participatory governance’, a set of terms focusing on community participation and public involvement in local decision-making. In the process of redefining local government as an ‘independent’ sphere with legislative and executive powers new definitions of ‘citizenship’, emphasizing public participation in decision-making and citizens capable of making demands, emerged. New local governance discourses were premised on the distinction between a citizen ‘in right’ and a citizen ‘in practice’, and the success of development was seen to be dependent on the extent to which citizens exercised their rights in practice. This was accompanied by a shift in viewing the rights of citizens not simply as those of ‘basic needs’, but in ‘furnishing the conditions for individuals and households to sustain themselves socially and economically.’

Increasingly emerging discourses of participatory governance have rooted themselves in ideas about state accountability and state responsiveness to the people. However, new local institutions such as ward committees, aimed at increasing citizen participation (and discussed in more detail below), have been given little real power over decision-making. There is a real danger that this could result in a burgeoning concentration and centralisation of power by local political parties to the exclusion of ordinary citizens. Although participatory governance discourses seem to offer more explicit references to a more empowered citizenry capable of overseeing the state, they are also embedded in continued tensions around the idea of an autonomous citizenry with institutions over and beyond those provided by the state and ruling party. Many state officials view emerging participatory institutions as champions of ‘national democratic transition’ which require strong political party structures to realise their potential.

Recently, local government reforms have embedded the notion of ‘citizenship’ in discourses on ‘participation’. Participation is seen by analysts and activists alike as a requirement, a condition, but also a guarantee of citizenship. This emphasis on participation conveys a view of citizenship as a form of action: to become a citizen is to participate, to struggle, to exercise the right to participate in order to achieve, materialize and guarantee other rights. In addition, such an emphasis often overlaps with a stress on citizenship as a process of the constitution of subjects: to be an ‘active’ citizen is to become a political subject, aware of his/her rights and power to struggle for them. However, the emergence of ‘participation’ discourses has also occurred in a political context of state-led institutional reforms in which the idea that citizens must have the right to ‘oversee’ the state does not feature prominently. As a result, there is little evidence of a democratic public sphere in which citizens can engage effectively with the state. There is
often a marked disconnect between public spaces in which citizens voice their claims and the political sphere of the state and its institutions. This disconnect is embedded in the glaring absence of middle-level institutions between state and society, and in which citizens and state ‘share power’.

Recently the term ‘citizenship’ has emerged explicitly and on its own terms in the context of social movement activism and the rise of popular protests against lack of service delivery. Campaigns such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) in Cape Town, South Africa, which is part of the larger anti-privatization movement, have mobilized disadvantaged township residents to assert their constitutional rights and resist evictions and service disconnection. In the field of AIDS/HIV activism there have been significant successes in forging new spaces for citizen engagement across the citizen society/state boundary, and in creating a viable social movement capable of engaging the state both nationally and locally. However, while there is evidence of new strategies of popular mobilization that make use of multiple sites of engagement, ranging from the courts to spaces of popular mobilization, it is as yet far from clear whether these mobilizations and campaigns actually transform state/civil society relations in any meaningful way.

4. ‘Participatory Governance’ in South Africa

But what precisely is participatory governance in South Africa? The first reference to participation in post-apartheid local government is to be found in the South African constitution of 1996\(^{19}\). The White Paper on Local Government of 1998 suggests that ‘municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation’\(^{20}\). However, it is really only with the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and especially the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 that participatory local governance was given institutional life. Where the Structures Act sets out the various structures of local government including ward committees, the Systems Act outlines how they are to be used. More specifically Section 16 obliges municipalities to ‘develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance’.

Some explanation of South African local government is needed before outlining participatory governance in more detail. For the first time in South Africa’s history, post-apartheid local government is one standard system that includes the entire geographical area of the country. It is one of three ‘spheres of government’ with technically equal status to the provincial and national spheres. Further, for the first time local government has a developmental role in addition to the traditional provision of services such as water and electricity. Lastly, local government is democratic both in that it is elected, and in that it is required to implement forms of public participation known as ‘participatory governance’ between elections.

It is important to note that there are three different kinds of municipalities: Category A municipalities are Metropolitan Councils, which have exclusive municipal executive and
legislative authority over a large city. At the moment there are seven of the in the country including eThekwini (Durban) which is one of our case studies. Category B are Local Councils, basically cities and towns including Msunduzi (Pietermaritzburg), another case-study, which share municipal executive and legislative authority in their areas with a category C municipality within whose areas it falls. Category C municipalities are District Councils which include both cities and towns and the rural areas that surround them. Typically municipal executive and legislative authority is shared such that cities and towns effectively run themselves, while districts manage rural areas, and supply bulk services like water and electricity to cities and towns too.

Having established the institutional context, what then is ‘participatory governance’? There are basically three aspects: the definition of municipality, ward committees and consultative processes around planning, budgeting and the like. The first of these is in some ways the most remarkable and yet intangible. The Systems Act defines the municipality as consisting of the governing structures (the elected councillors), the administration (the appointed staff) and the residents. The definition of residents as part of the municipality is claimed to be unique in the world\(^{21}\), and establishes the grounds for greater involvement by the public in municipal matters. While the practical implications of this definition are not yet obvious, the symbolic ramifications are considerable.

The second innovation is the ward committee system. The Municipal Systems Act provides for ward committees to be established in each ward of a Category A or Category B municipality, if the municipality so chooses, though of late government has been suggesting that the ward committee system be made compulsory for all municipalities\(^{22}\). Chaired by the ward councillor, ward committees are intended to consist of up to ten people representing ‘a diversity of interests’ in the ward, with women ‘equitably represented’. Ward committees may make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward (i) to the ward councillor; or (ii) through the ward councillor, to the metro or local council, the executive committee, the executive mayor and so on. Notably, ward committee cannot be delegated executive powers, and their primary function is to ‘create formal unbiased communication channels… between the community and the council’\(^{23}\). They are also required to mobilise the community to participate in service payment campaigns, the development planning and budgetary processes, decisions about service provision, by-laws and the like.

Thirdly, participatory governance involves form of public involvement in core municipal processes like development planning, performance management, performance, the budget and strategic decisions relating to services\(^{24}\). In short, public participation is statutorily injected into the most important municipal processes. Government policy on how public consultation on these issues ought to occur is quite limited, and usually manifest in the insistence of using ward committees. In practice, it seems, most consultation happens through the use of public meetings called by the mayor, also known by their isiZulu name, mayoral izimbizo (public meetings).

How effective are these institutions? Not very. We provide a provisional answer to this drawing on our empirical research into two main cases from the province of KwaZulu-
Natal. Our municipalities are the metropolitan city of eThekwini which includes Durban, the third largest city in the country, and the city of Msunduzi (KZ225), the seventh largest city in the country. Msunduzi and eThekwini are quite different municipalities in many ways. They are different categories, town and metropolitan respectively, and thus have a significantly different scale of responsibilities & resources. Msunduzi covers an area of approximately 649 square kilometres and with a population of in excess 500,000 inhabitants, whereas eThekwini covers an area of approximately 2297 square kilometres with a population estimated to be 3.5 million. In addition, the annual budget of Msunduzi is in the region of R1.9 billion whereas eThekwini’s annual budget is seven times bigger at R15 billion. Where Msunduzi spends about just less than R40 million on salaries, eThekwini spends roughly R559 million on staff.

We look to explain the poor implementation of participatory governance in terms of poor administration, a lack of elite political commitment to public participation, and poor institutional design. Although our insights are garnered from but a few cases, there is good reason to expect similar findings across the country in respect of all three problems.

5. The Poor Administration of Participatory Governance

The poor administration of participatory governance is revealed in (i) the slowness to develop policy at both national and local level, and the uneven and often shambolic implementation of both (ii) ward committees and (iii) processes of public consultation.

*Slow policy development*

Despite adoption of Municipal Systems Act in 2000 it is notable that little happened in respect of meaningful public participation for some time. According to the national Department of Provincial and Local Government’s (DPLG) forthcoming National Policy Framework for Public Participation, this was because ‘municipalities wrestled with a multitude of other transformation issues with the result that very few actively encouraged communities to involve themselves in the affairs of the municipality.’

Hence, it is only really with the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and especially the Systems Act of 2000 that participatory local governance was given institutional life.

Over the last three years or so, the DPLG has endorsed the Community-Based Planning (CBP) methodology for use in local planning. Based on a number of principles, (CBP) Community-Based Planning seeks the active involvement of the community, especially poor people, so as to improve the quality of plans and services, extend community control over development and empower communities so that they take action and become less dependent. The community implements its action plan through local structures such as ward committees or local stakeholder forums. These will be supported by Community Development Workers (CDWs), who have a critical role to play during the planning, as well as during implementation. The role of government is presented as strengthening and not replacing community activity.
In 2003 the Community Development Workers (CDWs) initiative was introduced by the national presidency, to assist local communities in accessing government services and in meeting their needs. CDWs are meant to play a supportive role to the ward committees by ensuring that ward committees and civil society are informed on government support and service, and encouraging ward committees and civil society to engage with opportunities for consultation. They are also meant to assist in identifying local needs and facilitating CBP locally, assisting in the implementation of community activities and projects by community structures, and providing technical support to ward committees to monitor community projects and to account to communities and municipalities.

The final set of policy initiatives related to current attempts to develop public participation policy framework documents at local, provincial and national level. Hence, in 2006 the KwaZulu-Natal government embarked on drafting a provincial Community Participation Framework, which while completed has yet to be launched, and in 2007 the national directorate of public participation and empowerment commissioned a new version of the National Policy Framework for Public Participation which has been completed, but is still to be adopted by cabinet\textsuperscript{26}. The delay in developing these policies, and the recent flurry of policy work related to public participation in local governance, are suggestive of both an initial lack of urgency around implementing local participation, and a more recent concern to react to the widespread protests around poor local governance leading up to the 2006 local government elections.

Similar trends are evident at the local level. Hence the Msunduzi municipality did not finalise a public participation policy during the five years from 2001 to 2006. Further, while it did manage to generate a draft in 2005, it is still reported to be in the consultative phase before being adopted by the executive committee and then council\textsuperscript{27}. Further, the draft policy is very brief, at less than five pages, and makes no reference to civil society whatsoever. Instead emphasis is placed on ward committees, public meetings and various forms of communication between communities and councillors. The slowness to develop relevant policy and the confusion over the significance of civil society for public participation (indeed over the meaning of public participation at all) is repeated in the eThekwini case too. Hence although eThekwini has a public participation policy, entitled Citizen Participation Policy: Framework for eThekwini Municipality, it was only adopted in 2006. Notably, the document emerges from a preceding project, the 2004 eThekwini Municipality Community Participation and Action Support Strategy (COMPASS) which consulted communities and stakeholders in the five area-based management areas of the south Durban basin. Emergent from this consultation was a critique of the failure of community participation due to dominance of public spaces by political parties, lack of city investment in participation between election times, dependence on the ward councillor, poorly developed community stakeholder structures, limited impact on community policing forums and the general unresponsiveness of local government\textsuperscript{28}.

Lastly, there is good reason to assume that other municipalities are similarly tardy in adopting public participation policies, as suggested by the fact that, as indicated above in respect of Project Consolidate, nearly half are deemed in need of assistance to fulfil their
basic functions, never mind take the initiative to develop their own public participation policies.

**Poor implementation of the ward committee system**

In Msunduzi 2001-2006 ward committees did not operate well. Less than half of all ward committees were formally established in 2001, and many of these either never got off the ground in the first place or for one or other reason became defunct and ceased to function. As many as eight of the original ward committees were later re-established or reformulated (Wards 13, 19, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 34); and four of these eight ward committees were established directly by their respective ward councillor (Wards 13, 27, 28 and 29). While there are many reasons for this failure, poor administrative support is a key one, as reflected in the disorganisation around the constitution of ward committees, and in the lack of support given by administrators to ward committees in their operation.

As regard constitution, at the beginning of September 2001 the municipality outsourced the tasks of both establishing ward committees and training ward committee members to a company named Lavender Development Specialists (hereafter, Lavender), a group of ANC-aligned lawyers and ex-councillors. Lavender was given until Christmas 2001 to establish all 37 ward committees. However, by the time this deadline was reached, only 16 ward committees had been established, six of these in the Edendale area. Lavender was granted an extension to March 2002, but by mid-April 2002, nine wards (all or mostly in the Vulindlela area) were still without committees. Despite the fact that training had been part of Lavender’s original 2001 brief, the delays in setting-up ward committees carried over into the process of training. Eighteen months later, at the end of 2004, the City Manager was still pleading with Exco to agree to pay for training. The core problem was a lack of external funding to pay for training. This resource issue re-emerged in many complaints from ward councillors about a shortage of finance and other resources, including ward committees having no budgets of their own, contributed to training, transport and administrative difficulties, but most of all offered few incentives to ward committee members and for the smooth functioning of committees.

Notably, the delay in election of ward committees in Msunduzi and 2007 and the failure to constitute ward committees altogether in eThekwini in 2001 are discussed under the section on partisan politics below.

**Poor implementation of the consultation requirements for budgets, IDPs etc**

The implementation of requirements for public consultation on core municipal processes in Msunduzi and eThekwini is to some extent a study in contrasts. Where eThekwini started very well with extensive public involvement in the ‘Big Mama’ process of development planning and budgeting in 2002, this kind of consultation dropped off almost entirely in the following years. Conversely Msunduzi, slowly implemented a series of public meetings around the IDP and budget which have become institutionalised to a twice yearly process today. In addition to questions of the efficacy of these processes (discussed in the design section below), public consultation has been limited to these
meetings, and not meaningfully included civil society, not for that matter ward committees.

eThekwini’s first planning process around the IDP and budget was both participatory and needs driven, that is, it also drew on community-based planning methodologies. As part of this there were a series of five ‘Big Mama’ workshops which constituted the main public input into the process. These workshops drew together some 450 participants from all sectors of civil society, and spatial areas of the city, spheres of government, unions and traditional leadership. The first such workshop reflected on the eThekwini’s draft Long Term Development Framework (LTDF) which envisaged the city in 2020. Next were a series of 100 community workshops across the city to assess local needs, followed by a strategic budgeting exercise culminated in Big Mama 2 on 04 May 2002. The needs list obtained through the community process was related to sets of existing data and the planning teams proposed various technical interventions which were considered at Big Mama 2. Based on this, and after engagements with other spheres of government, the municipality launched its 2002/2003 people’s budget (Big Mama 3) at Kings Park on 29 June 2002. In February 2003 another Big Mama was called to reflect on and revise the budget.

While there is much to admire about the Big Mama process, what has happened since 2003 is also important. Not only has there been a clear downturn in regular and effective public participation in city planning but, a significant deal of time and effort has been invested in the development of technical systems in the municipality since 2002. Partly this has to do with new national requirements, but partly it reflects the growth of a culture of professionalism, and the particular commanderist style of the city manager. Hence tremendous energy has been invested in developing performance management systems for top officials, and implementing a new system of Area-Based Management to integrate planning spatially within the city. At the same time the city has found itself drawn increasingly into international networks of management and funding, and it seems clear that the top leadership have global ambitions for the city of eThekwini.

All these trends suggest a growing managerialism amongst the city elite, an attitude reflected in the indifference towards public participation of late. In the words of City Manager Mike Sutcliffe, ‘we know what people’s needs are. Indeed, for the next 100 years the needs will remain the same, although the rank order might well change’. He further expressed the view that the IDP and budget processes are too complex for ordinary people and that meaningful public participation as a long-term strategy:

…communities will spend their money on things that do not do anything. Communities spend their money on things that have no lasting impact on their lives. All that happens is that the public feels better about developing their area. Interest groups play a more significant role in public participation as they are useful in having more practical goals for the municipality.

From 2001 until the present, the Msunduzi municipality has undergone four separate public consultation processes around the budget and IDP. The first process concerned the
adoption of the first IDP in 2002. Notably, there was consultation conducted during the analysis and strategy phases of the project, but it was restricted largely to various stakeholder groups rather than the local community. Thus Holmes notes that although they had hoped to use ward committees as part of this initial IDP process, they were not functional enough to fulfil this role in 2002. In addition to the emphasis on stakeholders, several stakeholders like the Chamber of Commerce and some NGOs complained that public consultation was inadequate. Indeed Holmes conceded that while they made a sincere first effort at public participation in the IDP process, that it was inadequate. That the lopsided nature of public participation mattered was reflected in that most feedback from stakeholder meetings came from organisations rooted in more advantaged communities such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Scottsville Residents Association and the DA.

The second round of public participation concerned the annual review of the IDP/budget in 2004. Notably this round saw the introduction of two practices which have become standard since then. The first is the integration of the statutorily required public participation in the annual IDP and budget review processes into one process. Second, has been the introduction of a series of at least five public meetings or mayoral izimbizo, located in the five service areas of the Msunduzi municipality. A survey of the minutes from these meetings in May 2004 revealed similar format which has also endured until today. Following presentations on the IDP and budget, the audience asked a number of questions which were then answered by the various officials on the stage. Meetings took between three and four hours. Unfortunately it is not clear from the minutes how many people attended the meetings and whether entertainment and good were provided for the community. In this regard Madeline Jackson-Plaatjies reports that at his time, entertainment and food was only provided at some venues, but ‘since then it has now become a standard practice that we provide refreshments at all venues. In terms of the entertainment, this is still at selected venues as performances are voluntarily conducted by these groups.’

The third round of public participation was a series of eleven public meetings in November 2004 that served as the formal basis of the IDP review of 2004/2005. Notably however, it was from this time that the municipality introduced the use of surveys at izimbizo as an additional means of soliciting the views and needs of the communities. According to Madeleine Jackson-Plaatjies the surveys were introduced because ‘we have found that the meeting times (duration) do not allow adequate time for input from the majority of attendees at these meetings… The main aim of the questionnaire is to give those participants who did not get a chance to speak to put across their views and (mainly) their needs.’ Along with the minutes from the meeting, the survey data is then collated into a community needs analysis report and forwarded to the subsequent IDP and Budget processes.

6. The Lack of Elite Political Will for Participatory Governance
Ward committees are to be non-partisan spaces for community engagement, but actual practice in our two case-studies suggests they are more commonly seen as sites for partisan contest by political elites. Hence we identify (i) how party political agendas scuppered the very establishment of ward committees, (ii) how party political agendas undermined the implementation of municipal policy on ward committees, and (iii) how people not aligned to the dominant local party or intra-party network were often excluded from the ward committees.

Party and partisan conflict over the establishment of ward committees

While ward committees were instituted in the Msunduzi municipality by mid-2002, just less than one year after the local government elections of 2001, they were not established at all in the eThekwini municipality during the 2001 – 2006 term of office. According to city Manager Mike Sutcliffe the reason for this were twofold. First, when the IFP controlled the provincial government, it decided to implement sub-councils instead of ward committees. Second, when the ANC came to power in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004, the city decided to go the ward committee route, and approached the province to apply in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, and publish a Section 12 Notice formally constituting eThekwini as ‘a municipality with a collective executive system combined with a ward participatory system’. However, the department under Mabuyakulu ‘dropped the ball’, and this was never done.

In the interim though, the city proceeded with ward committee elections on the assumption that the legal niceties had been completed. A large number of ward committees were elected (70 according to Sutcliffe, 100 according to CPASU) According to Sutcliffe, in this process the ANC ‘out-mobilized the DA’ with regard to the ward committees in about four DA wards, by dominating ward committee election meetings although they had lost the ward. This meant that while the ward councillor belonged to the DA, the majority of the ten members of the ward committee belonged to the ANC. (Notably, while the DA agrees with the same description of events, they interpret them quite differently. In the words of DA Ward Councillor for Ward 35, Rory MacPherson: ‘Sadly, the ANC decided to abuse this facility and instead, bussed many people in from outside the ward and hijacked the election of these committees.) In response to this the DA took the matter to court, objecting to the whole ward committee process in terms of the failure by province to publish the required Section 12 notice. The court upheld the objection and ward committee elections were shelved until the next term of local government in 2007.

Notably, though a very similar set of problem plagued the constitution of ward committees in the Msunduzi municipality in 2006 – 2007. Despite having ward committees during the 2001-2007 period, and despite clear ANC dominance in the city, a power-struggle between the ANC mayor and other ANC leaders effectively delayed ward committee elections for some 19 months until November 2007. Indeed, had the provincial MEC for Local Government and Traditional Affairs not ordered the Msunduzi Municipality to hold ward committee elections by the end of October 2007, ward
committees would still not exist in the city. As it was the city missed the end of October deadline, prompting more heated ministerial pressure.

Substantively the conflict between the Mayor and the Speaker centred one who would administer ward committees, including ward committee elections. Where the Mayor wanted more control over these structures, including appointing an outside consultant to constitute the structures, the Speaker wanted ward committees, and ward committee elections, to be managed by his office. There is some debate over whether this power struggle is linked to the broader Jacob Zuma versus Thabo Mbeki factionalism in the party, or whether it is a more local rivalry between competing networks, or some combination of both. Whatever the reason, the desire to control ward committees is explained by the perception that controlling these structures offer an additional means of extending and consolidating a power-base in this intra-party competition. Hence, although the delay in constituting ward committees in Msunduzi in 2006-7 was not due to conflict between the ANC and opposition parties, as in eThekwini in 2001-6, it was also an instance of subjugating community participation to partisan political ends.

**Party conflict over the implementation of ward committee policy**

In Msunduzi between 2001 and 2006 we uncovered evidence of significant reluctance by both the IFP and DA opposition parties to the implementation of municipal policy around ward committees. Where officials described the DA as uncooperative and ‘doing their own thing’, several DA councillors described the municipality’s initiatives around ward committees as irrelevant for their committee members. Thus, according to Gardner, the DA claimed that their councillors were ‘sophisticated businessmen’ and as such ‘did not need to be taught how to write minutes and how to conduct meetings’\(^49\). DA councillor Lambert\(^50\), denying that the DA’s failure to attend Lavender’s training program was a party-based decision, explained that his ward committee members were already experienced in these things. Further, allegations were made by other DA respondents about the particularly partisan character of the official in charge of public participation in the municipality. Notably there is an interesting echo here of the DA’s attitude towards ‘ANC’ ward committee policy in Msunduzi.

**Party and partisan conflict over the composition and operation of ward committees**

Last, and perhaps most significant, was the conflict over the composition and operation of ward committees. Notably, and in contrast to the above, this form of conflict was manifest at ward level rather than municipal level, and tended to focus on which party, or network within the party, controlled the ward committee. In Msunduzi between 2001 and 2006 almost all the IFP ward committees, many ANC ward committees and some DA ward committees appeared to be subject to their respective party’s control. Notably, the perception of the party politicisation of ward committees seems to be shared by a range of respondents, ranging from the DA\(^51\), and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)\(^52\) to some Residents’ or Ratepayers’ Associations\(^53\) and the Speaker, Colin Gardner. In this regard the official in charge of public participation stated that the ‘politicisation’ of ward committees is especially a problem in historically-black areas\(^54\).
Noteworthy in this respect is that, of the 10 wards described as ‘politicised’ by Mngadi, seven ward councillors refused to talk to us, including four of five IFP wards. Indeed Mngadi claims that the IFP ward committees are seen as extensions of the IFP branch, and that individuals aligned with other parties, and principally the ANC, are simply not welcome.

Relatedly, traditional leaders had disproportionate influence on the composition of ward committees in the Vulindlela rural area. This area, which contains a formal traditional authority which is also a stronghold of the IFP, was the last area in which ward committees were established. One of the ward councillors in this area (Ward 3) directly attributed delays in setting-up a ward committee to the ‘political intolerance of IFP izinduna’. The two political parties concerned, the ANC and IFP, eventually resolved their differences by agreeing that five ward committee members would be appointed by the Vulindlela Traditional Authority and five would be elected from the community.

A similar allegation of party dominance of ward committees can be levelled at the ANC, though to a somewhat lesser extent. Consider the example of the ward councillor who combined ward committee and ANC branch meetings ‘to avoid a state of animosity between the two groups which are essentially the same thing’. Perhaps as pressing an issue, however, was intra-party factionalism within the ANC (and also, though less obviously, within other political parties). Illuminating in this regard were the descriptions of certain ANC ward councillors as ‘highly politicised’ and ‘friends of the mayor’ – a reference to the Thabo Mbeki/Jacob Zuma factionalism in the ANC. In Msunduzi, this takes the form of 2001-6 mayor Hloni Zondi and his associates allegedly aligning to Mbeki and Provincial Premier Ndebele, with new 2006- mayor Zanele Hlatswayo and associates supposed lining up behind Zuma and Provincial MEC for Economic Affairs, Zweli Mkhize.

Notably, it is far from clear that this factionalism is inherently ideological rather than patronage-driven. Several respondents referred to the fact that since the ‘revolution’ in the municipality in the late 1990s, when a significant number of ANC members were ‘deployed’ into the civil service, an elite rent-seeking network developed between top politicians and officials around the awarding of contracts. This crony-based network has been the subject of recent investigations and raids by the scorpions, relying to some extent on evidence supplied by the new political elites which, according to media reports, are engaged in very similar kinds of activities. In this context, ward committees become a means for competing networks within the ANC to consolidate and extend their support base, and hence a site for intra-party struggle.

Notably, the precise character of intra-ANC conflict does not need to be settled here. Whether ideological, patronage or personality-based, it reflects that in many ANC wards the ostensible task of ward committees to represent and pursue the interests of the entire local community in a non-partisan way, has become corrupted by ward-level interest groups, often connected to municipal level networks, pursuing their own, more narrow, agendas. A description of how this kind of politics was manifest at local level was offered
by the councillor for Ward 13, who described his relationship with his ward committee as ‘tense’. He added:

The Ward Committee has never been functional from the onset because the majority of the male members and I do not get along. This has been the case since 2002. You should see them in a meeting. The mood is always tense and it gets out of control usually verbally and otherwise. Some members who did not win during the election are the problem. They refuse to accept my authority as a Ward Councillor. The situation is so out of control that they conspire behind my back all the time. They go to the extent of holding their own meetings without me present at their own private venue but they do not attend mine. This has led to my ward committee’s breakdown as it is impossible to hold a meeting with two people. S—, for example, an A.N.C branch employee, is the instigator and he plans to campaign for the position of Ward Councillor in the next election.

In this regard it is notable that in the Msunduzu local government election of March 2006, only 17 of the 37 ward councillors were re-elected. Of the new councillors, 14 were ANC, and 11 (79%) of these had been on the previous councillor’s ward committee. Four of the five DA ward councillors had been PR councillors before, and the one new IFP councillor was a PR councillor before. In short, it is clear that for the ANC at least, ward committees are a major means of political apprenticeship, and to put the matter more sharply, even of political competition. When an ANC ward councillor sits down to chair his ward committee meeting he knows that his major rival for the position is also in the room. Clearly this knowledge must make a transparent and trustworthy relationship between the ward councillor and his ward committee somewhat difficult.

In eThekwini ward committees for the 2006-2011 period were constituted earlier this year and we have yet to fully unpack their constitution and operation. Nevertheless problems around local party competition were reported. According to Beverley Mothlabane, the Senior Manager of the CPASU and Desmond Myeza, Manager in the Speaker’s Office, the elections general went well with the main complaints being a lack of publicity and unhappiness from the DA around ‘ANC bussing’ in their wards. The DA’s Gillain Noyce complained of ‘a high level of invasion’ in many DA wards where ‘the ANC took over and there was no representation for Indians and whites in the area’. One exception she notes was ward eight where ‘buses of young ANC supporters turned up during the elections and were quite rowdy. The IEC stood firm against them and the police were called in to deal with them’. That such incidents occurred was confirmed by Beverley Mothlabane who commented, ‘we did have incidents reminiscent of the 1908s and we had then to mediate and intervene’.

7. The Poor Design of Participatory Governance

In analysing the design of participatory governance we draw attention to Fung and Wright’s work on successful ‘invited spaces’ which they term ‘Empowered Deliberative Democracy’ institutions. They argue that these institutions share three general principles, (i) a focus on tangible problems, (ii) the involvement of ordinary people affected by those
problems, and (iii) the deliberative development of solutions to those problems. Further, the EDD institutions share three design features (a) the devolution of public decision authority to empowered local units, (b) linkages that connect these units to each other and superordinate authorities, and (c) the generation and use of new state institutions to support and guide these decentred problem-solving efforts. Last but not least, they observe that EDD have numerous enabling conditions, but that the most important is the balance of power between actors involved such that participation is more likely when alternative strategies such as strategic domination or exist are less attractive.

As regards the invited spaces of participatory governance in South Africa, we argue that both ward committees and mayoral izimbizo are poor approximations of the empowered and participatory institutions of this sort. Neither ward committees nor mayoral izimbizo have any decision-making powers, and certainly none over resources. As indicated above, these powers are expressly reserved in law for politicians and may not be delegated to ward committees. Perhaps more importantly, the deliberative role of both ward committees and izimbizo are practically circumscribed. Although ward committees are meant to identify key issues affecting their ward and deliberate upon them, the failure to integrate ward committees explicitly into the decision-making or delivery processes of the local municipality means that there is little impact that they can have on deliberation. Currently they have no role in development planning or the budget at municipal or local level, nor do they have any direct say on how officials deliver on these commitments. All ward committees currently do, is bolster the voice of ward councillors at the monthly council meeting.

Further, by design ward committees must transfer their deliberations through the ward councillor to the council, and should the ward councillor be incompetent, disinterested, or marginalised for some other reason, the ward committees’ deliberations will count for nothing. Indeed, a strong case can be made that ward councillors are the weakest of all councillors due to the fact that the electoral system is only half constituency based, and is half proportional representation by party list. Notably, the senior party politicians in local government are almost always elected by party list and not from wards, which means that the key political players, especially those who sit on the municipal executive, do not have ward committees. In effect then, ward committees are a participation mandate imposed on disempowered politicians.

A similar set of problems with disempowerment face mayoral izimbizo. In the Msunduzi case it is clear that public meetings on the development plan and budget are not decision-making forums. Again, the law explicitly prevents this. However, they are not and indeed cannot be meaningful deliberative forums either, other than perhaps for further reflection on local needs. At these meetings communities are presented with a draft IDP and budget which they have not seen before the meeting. To date there have been no prior preparatory processes in communities, including community based planning by ward committees, despite the presence of national policy along these lines. Given the complexities of development plans and budgets, much of it imposed by national law and policy, there really can be no expectation of much meaningful input into these core documents using public meetings. When added to the failure to use virtually any other
means of public consultation around the IDP and budget, it seems safe to conclude that public consultation in Msunduzi has been much more an information dissemination technique or public relations exercise than genuine consultation.

It does not have to be this way. The Big Mama process in eThekwini in 2002 has practically modelled a much more meaningful public participation process that could be use around development planning and budgets. Not only were the development plans and budget clearly linked, but both communities and civil society were involved in the process, and critically, they were involved at every step of the process from need identification to strategy development and prioritisation to budgeting. The key problem with Big Mama is that it was a once off process that has been supplanted by very limited consultation in the name of efficient delivery. Where the light of public participation was generally low in Msunduzi, in eThekwini it flared brightly only to be left to die out.

Taken together, we argue that this means that participatory governance institutions fail to meet Fung and Wrights criteria (iii), (a), (b) and (c) listed above. Neither offer substantive opportunities to deliberate on solutions to local problems. Neither reveals a significant devolution of public decision authority to empowered local units. Nor are there adequate linkages that connect these ward committees and izimbizo to each other and super-ordinate authorities. Lastly, there has been almost nothing done by way of the generation and use of new state institutions to support and guide these decentred problem-solving efforts, as reflected in the marked lack of national or local policy initiative – at least until very recently.

Disempowerment is not the only problem with the design of participatory governance in South Africa. Real question marks also stand against the democratic status of both ward committees and mayoral izimbizo. More specifically, there are inherent problems with representation for both structures. Ward committees are representative structures which have a participatory role, rather than participatory forums for the public. They are comprised of ten people who must represent between 5000 and 1500 living in each ward. Is this really much of an improvement in representational terms on one ward councillor representing the ward? Further, given the very limited attendance at elections (20 to 500 people which means the poll is always <10%), and the tendency to local party dominance, can we really claim the ward committee really represents the local community. In addition, we found little evidence of practices of transparency or accountability by ward committees. Little effort was made to inform the public of ward committee meetings, take and archive accurate minutes in a professional way, or hold regular report-back meetings. The failure of municipalities to specify such requirements for ward committees (at least until 2006) reflected a disinclination to take ward committees seriously as democratic structures.

A similar problem confronts mayoral izimbizo. With the possible exception of some Big Mama gatherings, the largest number of people reported attending any public meeting on the IDP and budget between 2001 – 2006 was 500. Assuming in Msunduzi that every of the five meetings was this well attended, that means some 2500 of 500 000 people, or 0.5% of the residents of the city, accessed public participation on these key processes.
Given the limited opportunities for voice in these meetings, the number who commented on the IDP or budgeted was basically next to nothing. Of course input on the IDP and budget from 2500 key people involved in significant civil society organisations, or genuinely representing a significant constituency is clearly desirable and even impressive. Attendance at meeting by 2500 random residents is not. Hence, for both ward committees and mayoral public meetings we must question whether Fung and Wrights second criterion, (ii) the involvement of ordinary people affected by those problems, has been met. We would suggest not.

8. Conclusion

The democratisation of South African governance since 1994 has continued, especially at the local level, where an attempt has been made to institutionalise public participation through various ‘invited spaces’. The idea is to complement the system of multi-party representative government with a form of community participation that draws on indigenous traditions of democratic practice. Unfortunately, as our case-studies suggest, these invited spaces are not really working. Rather than being forums for genuine community engagement with local leaders, they tend to be at best exercises in public relation, and at worst, sites for capture by political elites.

The reasons for this are several and include poor implementation by administrators, but perhaps most importantly a lack of political commitment to community participation by political elites. Consequently, public participation has boiled down to ward committees and mayoral public meetings, neither of which operates with any consistency or potency. Further, we identify significant design flaws in both ward committees and mayoral izimbizo that will be found across the country. In addition, all of this happens in a context where civil society is often weak, and struggles for recognition before a government which embraces a state-centered view of development and transformation, and a ruling party which typically imagines itself as the only legitimate custodian of the popular will.

Consequently, as long as public participation in local governance remains limited to ward committees and izimbizo in their current forms, it will remain largely meaningless. With little incentive for citizens to participate in them, these structures will simply become another space for elite capture. However, as shown by the Big Mama process in eThekwini, should these spaces be reformed to be properly empowered, supported and democratised, the tradition of popular participation in South African political life could be reinvigorated. This will require will require a significant change of attitude amongst key political and bureaucratic elites, but perhaps the recent tumultuous xenophobic events will provide the spur to elite re-imagining of state-society relations in a more constructive and democratic way.

1 Section 16(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.


Interview with Yunus Carrim, ANC MP, and former chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Local Government, 26 October 2006.

This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the shift in theory of development from the ‘people-centred’, socio-economic, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994 to the liberal economic model of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme of 1996. For more on this see Tom Lodge. 1999. ‘Policy Processes Within the African National Congress and Tripartite Alliance’, Politikon, 26(1), 5-32.


Daily News 14/10/05.


Section 152 places an obligation on local government ‘to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.’ Further Section 195(e) states that ‘in terms of the basic values and principles governing public administration – people’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making’.


Interview with Yunus Carrim, 26 October 2006.


16(1)(a) of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000


This information comes from Laurence Piper’s personal involvement in both these processes.

Interview with Madeleine Jackson-Plaatjies, Manager, Strategic Analysis and Research, Msunduzi Municipality, 05 June 2007.

eThekwini Municipality Community Participation and Support Strategy (COMPASS), p7


The Witness newspaper 28 December 2001

Echo Newspaper 11 April 2002.


Ibid, P. 18


Interview with Mike Sutcliffe, eThekwini city manager, 16 October 2006.

Interview with Gavin Holmes, Town planner, Msunduzi Municipality on 24 October 2006.

Ibid.

Email correspondence with Madeleine Jackson-Plaatjies, Manager: Strategic Analysis and Research, Msunduzi Municipality, 19 September 2007.

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Interview with Mike Sutcliffe, eThekwini city manager, 16 October 2006.

Ibid.

Performance Assessment, Head: Community Participation and Action Support Unit. Period 2004/5. P. 6

Interview with Mike Sutcliffe, eThekwini city manager, 16 October 2006.


The Mercury newspaper on November 21, 2006, P. 4

Interview with Colin Gardner, Speaker, Msunduzi Local Council, 11 August 2005

Interview with Bill Lambert, Ward councillor, Ward 25, 18 August 2005

Interview with Mark Steele, P.R. councillor (DA), Msunduzi Local Council, 20 February 2006

Interview with Mrs Pillay, councillor (ACDP), Msunduzi Local Council, 20 February 2006


Echo 11 April 2002

Echo 13 September 2001

Echo 11 April 2002

Interview with Mr. S.N. Naidoo, Ward Councillor, Ward 28, 24 August 2005


Interview with Paul Thompson, Scottsville Residents Association, 19 October 2005.

Interview with Mr. T.M. Dlamini Ward Councillor, Ward 13, 19 September 2005

Ibid, previous two citations.


Interview with Beverley Mothlabane, Senior Manager of Regional Services, CPASU, Ethekwini Municipality, 09 Match 2007.

Op cit. p. 17.