Abstracts prior to 1986
We
critically examine Imre Lakatos' "Changes in the problem of inductive
logic." We are particularly concerned with evaluating Lakatos' arguments
as they apply to more recent work in inductive logic. Although many of Lakatos'
challenges to the programme of inductive logic are worth meeting, we are
doubtful that his overall critique succeeds. We try to show how complex and
difficult any such general critique would be.
Agassi, J.
(1981). Lakatos on proof and mathematics. Logique et Analyse, 24, 437-439.
Peggy
Marchi has interpreted the contribution of Imre Lakatos, his "proofs and
refutations", as a non-justificationist theory of the role of proof:
proofs should explain mathematical facts and be tested by thought experiments.
Lakatos had no comprehensive theory of mathematics. His trailblazing researches
thus constitute a challenge and a (non- justificationist) (progressive)
research program.
Agassi, J.
(1980). Was Lakatos an elitist? Ration: An International Journal of Analytic
Philosophy, 22, 61-63.
Applying
a criterion of scientific progress may lead to assessments conflicting with the
scientific elite. Elitism is readiness to give in. Applying a criterion to
historical cases may have the same effect; alternatively, endorsing today's
scientific elite's history, elitists may redefine the historical elite (the
elite of the mid-nineteenth century rejected field theory, yet today's elite
considers the original field theoreticians the true elite). Hence, proving
oneself non-elitist is showing willingness to clash with today's elite. Since
Lakatos refused to apply his criterion except in retrospect, the current debate
as to whether he was an elitist is undecidable.
Agassi, J.
(1979). The legacy of Lakatos. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 9, 316-326.
Lakatos
pretended he had a new revolutionary methodology of science. He had old
reactionary fragments-- Appraisal must be retrospective (Hegel); criticism must
be constructive (Lenin) since minor modifications may meet it (Duhem)--and a
new bizarre notion that scientific theories should be appraised in time-series.
This is based on the observation that some modifications are progressive, some
regressive. This observation comes from his superb proofs and refutations.
Lakatos' disciples can hardly do good work while following his silly
methodology of science instead of his wonderful heuristic of mathematics.
Derr, P.G.
(1981). Reflexivity and methodology of scientific research programmes. New
Scholasticism, 55, 500-503.
Two
central theses in Imre Lakatos' theory of science are: (1) the unit of
appraisal in science is not an isolated theory by a research program, a
developing "series of theories"; and (2) the methodology of research
programs may be applied to "any" norm-impregnated knowledge--including
even ethics, aesthetics, history, mathematics, inductive logic, and scientific
methodology. This paper argues that (1) and (2) are not cotenable, and offers a
revision of Lakatos' MSRP which progressively resolves the problem.
Dominicy, M.
(1983). Falsification and falsifiabilization from Lakatos to Goodman. Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, 37, 163-198.
Popper's
criteria for verifiability and falsifiability cannot deal with restrictive
statements, which express "Ceteris paribus" clauses (e.g., propositions
which limit the number of planets in the solar system). Restrictive statements
cannot be laws (as is shown by the interpretation of related counterfactuals)
nor initial conditions (since they are not verifiable). A methodological
principle is put forth, which constraints the use of restrictive statements and
provides a new solution to Goodman's "grue and bleen" paradox.
Hacking, I.
(Ed.). (1981). Scientific revolutions.
New York: Oxford University Press.
This anthology contains: editor's introduction; Kuhn,
"A function for thought experiments"; Shapere, "meaning and
scientific change"; Putnam, "The "Corroboration of scientific
theories"; Popper, "The rationality of scientific revolutions";
Lakatos, "History of science
and its rational reconstructions"; Hacking, "Lakatos's philosophy of
science"; Laudan, "A problem-solving approach to scientific
progress"; Feyerabend, "How to defend society against science";
and an annotated bibliography of 95 items useful to students.
Lehman, H.
(1980). An examination of Imre LakatosÕ philosophy of mathematics. Philosophical
Forum, 12, 33-48.
In this
paper, I explain Imre Lakatos views concerning the nature and function of proof
in mathematics. Lakatos maintained that no mathematical statements are known
indubitably. But this claim leads to questions concerning the nature and
possibility of proofs and mathematical reasoning.
Sarkar, H.
(1983). A theory of method. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Historians,
philosophers, and sociologists of science have long argued for using the
history of science as an arbitrator between competing methodologies. "A
theory of method" argues otherwise. It also offers: a theory of group
rationality, a theory of explaining rational decisions, framework for analyzing
methods, a different perspective on the relations between social sciences and
methodologies, and explains the importance of heuristic advice which it
considers as normative rather than empirical or conventional.
Steiner, M.
(1983). The philosophy of mathematics of Imre Lakatos. The Journal of
Philosophy, 80(9), 502-521.
See abstracts for 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1987, 1986, pre-1986.